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Pubblicazioni Ceris
Anno/Year
2012
Autori/Authors
Cerulli G.
Rivista/Journal
Rivista JASSS - Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
Titolo/Title
Are R&D Subsidies Provided Optimally? Evidence from a Simulated Agency-Firm Stochastic Dynamic Game
Libro/Book
Technical Report
Conference
Editor
City
Volume
v.15 f.7
Pages
Research
Politica della ricerca e processi di innovazione
Link
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/15/1/7.html
Abstract
By means of a simulated funding-agency/supported-firm stochastic dynamic game, this paper shows that the level of the subsidy provided by a funding (public) agency, normally used to correct for firm R&D shortage, might be severely underprovided. This is due to the "externalities" generated by the agency-firm strategic relationship, as showed by comparing two versions of the model: one assuming "rival" behaviors between companies and agency (i.e., the current setting), and one associated to the "cooperative" strategy (i.e. the optimal Pareto-efficient benchmark). The paper looks also at what "welfare" implications are associated to different degrees of persistency in the funding effect on corporate R&D. Three main conclusions are thus drawn: (i) the relative quota of the subsidy to R&D is undersized in the rival compared to the cooperative model; (ii) the rivalry strategy generates distortions that favor the agency compared to firms; (iii) when passing from less persistent to more persi
tipo - [joined to Pubblicazioni Ceris]
Tipo/Typology
ISI Article
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